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Abstract
What might have caused the post-2007 election violence in Kenya? Was it
election irregularities as widely claimed or could it have been simmering ethnic-
rivalries waiting to spill over? While not directly focusing on the post-election
violence, we investigate a number of issues that divided Kenyans in the 2007 Pres-
idential election. Following a rational choice framework and using survey data of
voter opinions, we find that Kenyan voters are strategic, seeking to maximize their
well-being and influenced by a number of factors that go beyond their ethnicity
such as their absolute and relative living standards, access to public goods and also
grievances arising from perceptions of discrimination. The evidence suggests that
Kenyan voting behavior is economically motivated, with retrospective interests,
thus contrasting other studies that consider Kenyans to be wholly identity voters.
The study also reveals significant heterogeneity depending on the voters’ primary
loci of identification– either in terms of their ethnicity, occupation or nationalis-
tic terms (Kenyans). The apparent ethnic divisions have resulted in a polarized
society with consequential weakening of the institutional base for economic de-
velopment. The study points to the necessity of institutional reforms that can
better harmonize ethnic claims and avert conflicts in the future.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D72, D74
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I. Introduction 
The economic models of voting are founded on the premise that voters are rational and “hard 
wired” with selfish preferences. Like in the market for goods and services, actors in the political 
markets engage in utility maximizing calculus when evaluating alternative issues or candidates. 
Faced with two or more alternatives, agents with selfish preferences make choices that best serve 
their individual interests and thus consistent with the expected utility maximization axiom.2 
Rational choice voting models provide a number of testable propositions of the behavior of voters 
including the decision whether to participate in an election and the choice between candidates and 
issues.  The theoretical proposition of the rational voter model finds empirical support in many 
studies of voting in western democracies (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Pacek and Radcliff 
1995).3  
 Much less is known about the determinants of voting behavior in developing countries. 
This is particularly the case for Africa where few countries have had a history of what would be 
considered regular, free and fair elections.  For most of the post-independence era, the majority of 
African countries have been either under military or single party rule. Even when elections were 
held under a single party rule, the results were subject to manipulation and hence not reliable as 
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 In the basic rational choice voting model as developed by Downs (1957) and extended by Tullock (1967) 
and Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 1973), a voter takes into account the expected utility arising from voting 
which depends on the expected benefits and costs of voting. This model has been extended to take into 
account the utility arising from the act of voting and also game theoretic approaches such as where the 
rational voter adopts a maximin-regret strategy and where voting is modeled as a  game of cat and mouse 
(see Ledyard 1981, 1984; Rosenthal 1983 and Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974). 
3
 This paper does not dwell on the decision whether or not to participate in an election but rather focuses on 
a voter’s choice between candidates. 
 2
indicators of voter intentions. It is only with the democratization movement that swept the 
continent during the 1980s and 1990s that many of the countries started holding regular and 
competitive elections.  Nevertheless, even where elections have been held on a regular basis, 
consistent data on individual voting behavior that permit testing of the rational voter models are 
rare. This is because the data are highly aggregated and not suited to evaluate the importance of 
different factors that enter into a voter’s utility function.  While such data provide some broad 
generalizations of “group” voting patterns, they are not well suited to analyze individual voting 
behavior as predicted by the rational voter model.  
 It is now widely accepted that the primary problem hindering development in many 
countries is their weak institutions. Institutional arrangements matter in influencing development 
outcomes as they determine human interactions in a society and the types and quality of policies 
that governments adopt.  A common feature of weak institutions is the poor quality of governance 
as characterized by a lack of accountability and transparency.  Democratization that involves 
opening political markets to political party competition and regular elections is considered central 
to institutional building in these countries. However, evidence is mixed as to whether competitive 
elections are stabilizing or not. On the one hand, open elections help in mediating disputes among 
groups and install broadly legitimate governments and thus increase institutional stability (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003; Carothers 2007; Soudriette and Pilon 2007).  On the other hand, there are also 
concerns that in ethnically divided societies, competitive electoral processes could in fact be 
destabilizing because such competitive politics tends to widen existing divisions and election 
outcomes deepen divisions between winners and losers (Snyder 2000; Wilkinson 2004; Mansfield 
and Snyder 2005, Eiffert, Miguel and Posner 2007). To appreciate the role that competitive 
politics play in institution building, a better understanding of voting behavior and especially the 
motivation for voter choices and also the issues that divide them is necessary. 
This study seeks to evaluate voting behavior in Kenya with a view to identifying the most 
important factors that influence electoral choices and also the issues that divide Kenyans. While 
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Kenya has remained fairly stable and peaceful during most of the post-independence period, 
violence between ethnic groups has tended to erupt around elections since the introduction of 
competitive multiparty politics. Ethnic violence and general lawlessness escalated following the 
December 27, 2007 elections resulting in loss of hundreds of lives and widespread destruction of 
property.  The study uses a unique dataset of Kenyan voters obtained from a survey conducted 
two weeks before the 27 December 2007 general elections to estimate the determinants of voter 
preferences. Of special interest is whether the revealed voter intentions can provide insights into 
the widespread ethnic violence that erupted after the 2007 elections.  In Section II, we provide a 
brief general discussion of what is known about voting behavior in Africa.  Section III outlines a 
model of candidate choice within the Kenyan context following the rational choice framework.  
In Section IV, we present some highlights of the data focusing on voter intentions. Section V 
discusses the empirical models and results, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Voting   in Africa 
Several  authors suggest that voting behavior in Africa is predominantly influenced by some form 
of identity factor such as ethnicity, family lineages, religion, etc. (Bratton and Van de Walle 
1997;  Barkan 1979; Ferree 2004, 2008; Lindberg et al 2008).  Substantial empirical evidence 
supports the view that the African is primarily an “identity” voter.  In essence, voting in Africa is 
in many cases nothing more than an ethnic census. An individual voter uses ethnicity as the proxy 
for the expected benefits for voting for a particular candidate. Simply, voting in Africa is 
considered to be largely dependent on ethnic identification.  Fridy (2007) for example concludes 
that ethnicity is an extremely significant factor in Ghanaian elections. Likewise, Erdmann (2007) 
finds that voter alignment and party affiliation are largely influenced by ethnicity.  Thus, although 
not exclusively, political parties in Africa tend to be dominated by particular ethnic groups rather 
than being on the basis of ideology. 
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 Ndegwa (1997) explains the observed ethnic voting patterns as due to the fact that 
Africans possess “dual citizenship.” That is, Africans are members of two types of political 
communities in the same temporal and spatial world. On the one hand, they are members of their 
civic-republican community which is often their ethnic or community group and to which they 
owe some obligations. At the same time, they are members of the modern national state. Ndeqwa 
suggests that the membership in the national state is guided by conception of status and rights 
rather than duties. This dual citizenship undermines the democratization process as Africans 
continue to show allegiance to their civic republican community.   
 Ethnic voting in Africa gives credence to Horowitz’s (1985) expressive voting hypothesis 
whereby ethnic voters use their votes to register their identity as members of groups. Such voting 
implies that voting is not the outcome of a careful evaluation of policy positions or the 
performance of leaders. Instead, it is identity that matters. Fish (2008) describes identity politics 
as follows: 
You are practicing identity politics when you vote for or against someone because of his or 
her skin color, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or any marker that leads you to 
say yes or no independently of a candidate’s ideas or policies.  In essence, identity politics is 
an affirmation of tribe against the claims of ideology……..An identity politics voter says in 
effect, I don’t care what views he holds, or even what bad things he may have done, or what 
lack of ability he may display, he’s my brother, or he’s my kinsman, or he’s my landsman,…  
 
In some cases, voting seems to go beyond ethnicity. In a study of the 1994 Malawi’s general 
election, Kalipeni (1997) shows that regionalism was the dominant factor explaining voting 
patterns. Although Malawi has many ethnic groups, none can claim a majority which necessitates 
formation of coalitions. The evidence shows that ethnic groups crystallized to form three “super 
ethnic groups” each in a distinct region. Although Kalipen suggests that voting patterns are 
primarily due to regionalism rather than ethnicity, it is clear that ethnicity remains important. 
 In a study of Nigerian elections, Lewis (2007) observes that while identity is important in 
Nigerian politics, ethnicity is not the only axis of identification. Identity in Nigeria takes many 
dimensions such as ethnicity, economic and religion. Furthermore, Lewis finds that identity is not 
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fixed and varies by region and over time. In other words, identity is rather fluid. Nevertheless, 
Lewis finds that ethnic feelings are strongest in for example the Niger Delta where people feel 
discriminated and exploited.  
Some recent studies using survey data of voting in Africa suggest that, while ethnicity is an 
important determinant of voting behavior in Africa, it is not the only factor (Bratton, et al 2005). 
Some studies find that that Africans are concerned about other factors that relate to their well-
being. In particular, some studies have shown that Africans are concerned about pocketbook 
issues such as their incomes and other indicators of economic well-being such as employment, 
living standards and provision of public goods (Posner and Simon 2002; Youde 2005).  
Furthermore, controlling for these other factors weakens the importance of ethnicity.  In short, 
ethnicity is important in voting decisions of Africans but might not necessarily be the most 
important. 
Kenya has for long been touted as beacon of peace, a success story in an otherwise 
troubled continent. Unlike many of her neighbors, Kenya has never experienced extensive civil 
strife or a military coup and the country has been under civilian rule since attaining independence 
in 1963. This state of relative stability was achieved primarily under a single-party rule and under 
a constitutional arrangement that endowed the presidency with immense powers.  Before 1991, 
the country appeared politically united and elections were held on regular basis without major 
problems although the president had a lot to say about which candidates were cleared by the party 
to compete in the elections. This appearance of peace, stability and unity unraveled after the 
introduction of competitive politics in 1991. During the 1992 and 1997 general elections, 
widespread ethnic violence occurred before the elections (Kimenyi and Ndung’u 2005).  Analysis 
of voting behavior based on aggregate data suggests that, since the return of multiparty 
democracy in 1991, ethnicity has been a dominant factor in explaining voting patterns in Kenya 
(Kimenyi 1997; Muigai 1995; Orvis 2001). Basically, it seems that members of particular ethnic 
groups mostly join the same parties and primarily support the same candidates. Many analysts 
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have therefore concluded that voting in Kenya, like in many other African countries, is merely an 
“ethnic census.”  Oyugi (1997) for example shows that ethnicity was the most defining factor in 
the 1992 elections. Not only were political parties formed along ethnic lines, but also voting was 
primarily in ethnic blocks.  This pattern was repeated in the 1997 general elections. However, in 
the 2002 elections, several ethnic groups came together to form a grad coalition.4   By and large, 
the recent elections in Kenya have taken a clear ethnic dimension.  
Nevertheless, it might be misleading to conclude that voting in Kenya is influenced 
purely by identity. First, it would suggest that all individuals in an ethnic group vote the same 
way regardless of age, gender, income group or profession. Although majority of voters from a 
particular group may vote for a particular candidate or issue, aggregate data does not for example 
reveal whether the poor and the rich, or young and old, exhibit similar voting patterns. Second, it 
could be that ethnicity correlates with other factors such as poverty, income, unemployment, etc. 
As such, many members of a group may vote against an incumbent not because he or she is a 
member of a different ethnic group but because they may consider the incumbent as having failed 
to deal with creating opportunities for growth in their regions.  Finally, the ethnic census 
argument would seem to suggest that, quality of leadership as demonstrated by policy and 
implementation does not really matter.    
 
III. A Model of Candidate Choice 
To model the voters’ choices, we assume that the country is represented by voters who share a 
utility function of the following general form: 
            Uk(Qi,  Gi, γ )                                                                                          (1) 
Where Qi is private consumption, Gi is consumption of publicly provided goods and services and 
γ
 is a measure of the cost of voting. We denote institutional arrangements with k which signifies 
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 Nevertheless, this coalition was short lived and broke down following disagreements over the proposed 
constitution.  
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leadership under the incumbent president Kibaki—or simply the pre-election status quo.  The first 
decision the voter makes is whether to participate in the elections at all. Denote participation 
decision by p where p=1 if the citizen decides to vote and p=0 if the citizen does not participate. 
The citizen then decides either to vote for Kibaki (k=1) or opposition candidate (k=0).  The 
probability of an individual voting for Kibaki “k=1” or alternative candidates “k=0” is assumed to 
depend on the expected benefits such that: 
    k=1 if Uk=1(Qi, Gi , γ ) > Uk=0(Qi, Gi, γ ) and  k=0 if Uk=0(Qi, Gi, γ )> Uk=1(Qi, Gi, γ )       (2) 
Although the cost γ  of participating in the electoral process varies across individuals and regions, 
we assume that the cost is uniform across all voters of type k=0 and k=1.  In other words, there is 
no reason to believe that cost of voting varies systematically between supporters and opponents of 
the various candidates. Thus we ignore any differences in participation rates that could arise 
because of differences in γ . 
Qi and Gi depend on a vector of variables X that influence voters’ well-being in terms of 
consumption of private goods and publicly provided goods. Thus the probability of an individual 
(i) voting for Kibaki (k=1) can be expressed by the cumulative logistic distribution function as 
follows: 
                            Ki = 1/[1 + e-(  α  +
β
 Xi)
 ].                                                                (3) 
The survey data used in this study permits us to estimate the logistic function directly because 
data are based on individual voter responses and include a wide range of demographic 
characteristics and indicators of individuals’ economic status. 
 Private consumption (Q) is largely a function of ones earning opportunities in the market 
place and can be proxied by indicators such as voter’s living conditions and employment status.  
In making voting choices amongst a number of candidates, voters evaluate their current economic 
status and in particular the changes during the incumbent’s tenure.  If opportunities for earning 
market incomes improved, then the probability of voting for the incumbent increases, and vice 
versa.  In studying voting in the 2007 elections, this aspect is of particular importance.  President 
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Kibaki came to power at a time when the country was in a dire economic state characterized by 
very low rate of economic of growth.  During the five years of his presidency, the country 
achieved growth rates, exceeding 6 percent in 2007.   
 But economic growth may not tell the whole story. In their evaluation of the incumbent 
versus opposition candidates, voters evaluate their current economic status both in absolute and 
also relative terms. As the Kenyan economy expanded, there was widespread skepticism that only 
the well-off were actually benefiting from the expansion. We consider this perception—real or 
imagined to be a source of grievance.  
Government provision (G) can be highly valued and is expected to have major influence 
on voting decisions. Generally, voters have expectations of some quantity and quality of public 
goods and services such as law and order, health care, education, etc. Over the last few years, 
particular concern has been on quality of infrastructure, cost of schooling and corruption among 
others. Because of the importance of these types of goods in a voter’s utility function, voters can 
be expected to reward or punish the incumbent depending on how well they consider the 
government to have performed in delivery of goods and services. First, voters evaluate the 
incumbent relative to previous regime. Voters could also evaluate Kibaki’s performance in regard 
to the provision of public goods by evaluating his government’s pre-2002 election pledges. If he 
kept most of the pledges during his term, then voters would be inclined to support him, and vice 
versa. Voters would also have evaluated incumbents and opposition candidates based on the 
pledges made during the 2007 election campaigns. If the incumbent had fulfilled previous 
pledges, voters are more likely to believe him on new pledges. On the other hand, voters may 
prefer opposition candidates because of their pledges and also as a punishment for the failure of 
the incumbent to keep pledges.5 
 Based on the existing evidence, there does appear to be a link between group identity and 
expectation of publicly provided goods. While voters expect candidates to perform in the delivery 
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 The failure to keep pledges is discussed later in this section as another possible source of grievance. 
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of services in general, they also expect patronage goods from those with whom they share identity 
(Kimenyi 2006). It is for this reason that voters tend to identify along some identifying cleavages.  
To understand how identity influences voting behavior, we decompose G as follows: 
                                                  G = gg + gp                                                              (4) 
where gg signifies general provision of public goods (non-excludable)  that benefit all members of 
the society and gp are patronage goods that benefit members of a particular group only.6  Thus, for 
each candidate, a voter evaluates expected  utility from gg and gp. Assuming that patronage goods 
are provided only on the basis of identity, then gp is positive for a voter if the winning candidate 
is a member of the same ethnic group.  Thus, other things equal, a citizen who is a member of 
group (i) will vote for a candidate from another ethnic group (j) only if expected utility from 
public goods under a president from group j (Uij) is greater than the expected utility from public 
and patronage good provided under a president from own group (i) (U ii). Thus, non ethnic voting 
occurs if : 
                                               Uij(gg) > Uii (gg) + Uii (gp)                                                    (5)  
 Simply, if voters expect patronage goods from the leaders with whom they share identity, 
then they are likely to practice identity politics. We note that there are many characteristics that 
individuals could identify with. According to the previous literature, probably the most important 
identifying feature is ethnicity.  Other loci of identification can include aspects such as voter’s 
education level, occupation, age and religion.  The point we stress here is that voters, expecting 
patronage goods, are likely to vote for those candidates with whom they share identity. 
 A ruler benefits from providing patronage goods because such solidifies support and any 
other non-pecuniary benefits that may go with “supporting own community.” But provision of 
patronage goods could also come at a cost. As more resources are devoted to gp, less gg is 
supplied to the citizens.  In other words, as a government rewards supporters with jobs and other 
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 One way to think of patronage goods is the privatization of public goods for the benefit of specific people 
or groups. 
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benefits, less of general public goods are provided which lowers the probability of voting for the 
incumbent. This effect can be expected to be more important among those who do not share 
identity with the incumbent. The other costs, and probably more important, is that provision of 
patronage goods necessarily translates into widespread grievances. As members of one group 
benefit disproportionately from political allocation of resources, others lose and feel 
discriminated against and basically ignored by the incumbent.  
 Another possible source of grievance is the failure of an incumbent to deliver on pledges 
of public goods made or to go against the general will of the people.  During the 2002 campaigns, 
then candidate Kibaki ran on a platform to fight rampant corruption, provision of free primary 
education and enactment of a constitution that devolved executive powers. We expect that voter’s 
evaluation of Kibaki’s performance on these issues to impact their voting decisions.   
 
IV. Analysis of Voter Intentions 
As observed above, the majority of studies about voting behavior in Kenya and in Africa 
generally are based on aggregate data. Unfortunately such data are not well suited to reveal voter 
intentions as they lack vital socio-economic information, views on grievances, economic 
interests, evaluation of policy, etc.  In this study, we overcome these limitations by using a 
detailed survey data on voter characteristics and opinions. 
We use data from a nationally representative survey of Kenyans aged 18 and over 
conducted just two weeks ahead of the General Election of 27 December 2007 hence providing a 
good picture of voting intentions and economic/political perceptions. To ensure that respondents 
fully understand the survey questions, whenever possible interviews were conducted in the 
respondents’ mother tongue. In total, interviews were conducted in 10 of the most widely spoken 
languages in Kenya. The sample includes 1,207 Kenyans from all the eight provinces, and 
covering 76 out of 210 electoral constituencies. The sample captures the rural/urban split 
consistent with the most recent Kenyan census that shows that 65 percent of respondents live in 
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rural areas and the remainder in urban areas.  The ethnic distribution of the sample respondents 
also matches to that of the national population.7 
At the time of our survey, most respondents –96 percent planned to participate in the 
elections. Our survey showed that the leading candidates—Kibaki and Odinga- were in a virtual 
statistical tie and any of them could have won depending on voter turnout.  The Election 
Commission of Kenya declared Kibaki the winner with 51.3 percent of the votes to 48.7 percent 
for Odinga. The opposition claimed fraud and international electoral observers reported a number 
of irregularities in the tallying and counting of ballots. The outcome of the elections, and 
primarily because of the belief that the election was rigged, culminated in unprecedented level of 
violence. While our research does not dwell on issue of irregularities, we are able to infer from 
the survey that the electorate was highly polarized between two candidates, Odinga and the 
incumbent president Kibaki. 
But what is the root cause of the polarization of the Kenyan electorate? Was it just ethnic 
rivalry waiting at the surface to spill over as much of the media has reported? Perhaps, a way to 
start unravelling this complex issue is to understand in the first place, the most important factors 
that motivated Kenyans to support their preferred candidates. We asked Kenyans this question in 
our survey and the responses were as Figure 1 shows. 
[Figure 1] 
As the results show, over 90 percent of the respondents stated that they would select a candidate 
based on the candidate’s track record in terms of honesty, experience in handling funds and care 
for the community. Perhaps, most surprisingly, only less than one per cent of survey respondents 
(0.80 percent) stated that the ethnicity/tribe of the candidate was the most important factor in 
shaping their voting motivations. This contrasts to what has been portrayed about the Kenyan 
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 In piloting and fieldwork we found that the vast majority of Kenyans were welcoming and eager to talk 
freely about their voting intentions. The survey reached a response rate of 80 per cent, a high rate for 
studies of this kind in Kenya. 
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voter especially in light of the post-electoral conflict and also the evidence of identity voting 
reported in previous studies.  
Classifying voter preferences for presidential candidate based on the voters’ ethnic group 
shows that there is unison in voting patterns among most ethnic groups. The three main 
presidential candidates, Kibaki (a Kikuyu), Odinga (a Luo) and Kalonzo (a Kamba) were 
overwhelmingly supported by the people from their own ethnic groups (as shown in Figure 2). 
That is 40 per cent of the surveyed population intended to vote along tribal lines. Other ethnic 
groups that did not have a major presidential candidate seem to have voted for one of the 
candidates in a block: The Luhyas and Kalenjins primarily supported mainly Odinga while the 
Merus and Embus supported Kibaki.  Hence, most ethnic groups voted along ethnic lines.  
[Figure 2] 
The contrasting evidence in our survey between voting intentions by ethnicity and the 
self-described voting motivations might also suggest that Kenyans are in denial. Kenyans could 
be voting on ethnic lines, despite not acknowledging ethnicity to be their main motivations to 
vote. An explanation of this could be that Kenyans are trapped in a low-trust equilibrium.  
Kenyans might not want to vote based on ethnic lines, but because they expect others to vote 
along tribal lines, they also adopt an ethnic voting strategy. The belief that others would vote on 
the basis of ethnicity could be reinforced by the fact that much of the political campaigning 
played on the ethnic sensitivities and loyalties of their followers inducing voters to cast their 
ballots along  ethnic lines. As the Daily Nation put it in an editorial: "What, at the moment, seems 
to matter is the ethnicity of the three candidates, one reason why Kenyans keep voting for the 
wrong people..." 
However, one should be cautious in drawing bold conclusions from the strong correlation 
between ethnicity and voting intentions. Correlations do not reveal causalities. Ethnicity could be 
masking other factors. Furthermore, identity goes beyond one’s ethnic group as socio-economic 
aspects come into play. Kenyans have enjoyed a rapid economic and social transformation over 
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recent years involving a speedy expansion of the middle class, urbanisation and growing 
expectations about what democracy can deliver. All these factors undoubtedly contribute to re-
shaping Kenyans identity. It is then important to understand how Kenyans see themselves. To 
analyse this we asked the following question: We have spoken to many Kenyans and they have all 
described themselves in different ways.  Some people describe themselves in terms of their 
language, ethnic group, race, religion or gender and others describe themselves in economic 
terms, such as working class, middle class or a farmer.   Besides being Kenyan, which specific 
group do you feel you belong to first and foremost? 
When asked to depict their group identity in this way, few Kenyans (20 percent) identify 
in terms of their ethnicity, 37 percent of respondents insisted on identifying themselves first and 
foremost in nationalistic terms, that is as Kenyans.  The rest of respondents, that is 43 percent, 
identify themselves on non-ethnic or nationalistic basis, notably those based on occupation (18 
percent), social class (7 percent), gender (4 percent) and on religion (3 percent). 
By depicting how the distinct identity groups intended to vote, we see that there is no 
correlation between how Kenyans intended to vote and how the primarily identify themselves.  
Figure 3 reveals that the Kenyan electorate was divided between Kibaki and Odinga, regardless 
of which category they identify themselves with. In other words, support for leading candidates 
was not based on these other axis of identification. Thus, when we take into account how 
Kenyans identify themselves, it becomes apparent that Kenyan’s voting intentions went beyond 
mere tribalism. Tribalism might well be an important aspect, but it is not the only one. But what 
else could have divided the Kenyan voters so severely? 
[Figure 3] 
Potential grievances could have been caused by recent and past performance of the 
incumbent president Kibaki. He has irrefutably improved the economic outlook of Kenya since 
2002. In his own words, Kibaki stated: 
 14
 Under my stewardship, together with you all, we have revived the economy, growing at 
a record rate of 6.1% in 2006, and created over 1,800,000 jobs, both in informal and 
formal sectors, resulting in better incomes for the people of Kenya. Per-capital incomes 
have increased from an average US $ 400 in 2002 to an impressive US $ 630 today, and 
are set to grow ever further under the PNU Government. Our growing economy has 
supplied us with the means to reduce poverty levels by an impressive 10.8 percentage 
points from 56.8% in 2000 to 46.0 of the population in 2006. Consequently more than 
two (2) million people have been lifted out of absolute poverty since we came to office. 
Together we have fought ignorance on every front, ensuring that every child has the 
opportunity to learn through the Free Primary Education. (PNU 2007, p.1) 
 
As our survey shows, the Kibaki administration received favourable approval by most 
Kenyans. For instance, we asked Kenyans to compare the overall economic conditions during 
Kibaki’s administration to that of the immediate former president Daniel Moi. According to our 
survey, 60 percent of respondents perceived the economic conditions of the country to be better 
or much better during Kibaki’s rule, whilst 25 percent perceived it worse or much worse.   The 
survey data reveals that roughly half of those who considered economic conditions to have 
improved during Kibaki’s first term intended to re-elect him. In contrast, those who thought the 
economic conditions were better during Moi’s rule intended to vote for the opposition candidates 
and more so for Odinga. 
These perceptions of the overall economic performance could well have influenced 
Kenyan’s voting intentions. But these perceptions refer to how Kenyans through the incumbent 
President has ruled Kenyans in general terms. A more direct source of concern for voters could be 
how their specific living conditions changed during Kibaki’s rule. According to our survey, 29 
percent perceived their living conditions were better or much better during Kibaki’s rule. The 
majority of Kenyans, 71 percent of respondents, did not see an improvement in their living 
conditions during Kibaki’s rule. Specifically 26 percent thought that their living conditions were 
the same and 45 percent thought that their living conditions were worse or much worse during 
Kibaki’s rule. 
[Figure 4] 
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Kibaki’s performance ratings give a mixed picture. They suggest that although the 
majority of respondents recognise Kibaki administrations overall economic achievements, only a 
few felt that their living conditions actually improved during Kibaki’s rule. In other words, 
Kenyans perceptions could suggest that the economic benefits gained during Kibaki’s rule were 
concentrated to only a few people.  So it is not surprising that the majority of people who did not 
consider their living conditions to have improved intended to vote for opposition candidates.  
Figure 5 shows that 81 percent of those who perceived their living conditions as worse or much 
worse during Kibaki’s rule intended to vote for Odinga. In contrast, the majority (63 percent) of 
those who perceived their living conditions as better or much better during Kibaki’s rule intended 
to re-elect Kibaki.  
[Figure 5] 
In addition to Kibaki’s past record, the future governance structure of the country was 
another major issue discussed during the election campaigns. The economic and political outlook 
of the nation undoubtedly could also have affected Kenyan’s voting intentions. Kibaki first 
became President in 2002 aided by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) bringing to an end 
KANU’s one-party dominance since Independence in 1963. The NARC government promised to 
deliver a new constitution devolving power away from the centre, to settle land rights that had 
caused violent conflict in the past, and also to share political power among Kenya’s diverse 
groups —possibly between a President and a Prime Minister. 
In the third year of Kibaki’s administration, a draft constitution was prepared and was 
subjected to a referendum in November 2005. This draft constitution was overwhelmingly 
rejected by the Kenyans primarily because the proposed constitution still concentrated powers on 
the presidency. The outcome of this referendum was a blow to Kibaki’s leadership two years 
ahead of the presidential election. Although it was not a vote of confidence on Kibaki’s three 
year-old administration, some Kenyans could have voted against the ratification of the draft 
constitution in part because they were disillusioned with Kibaki’s government.  Furthermore, the 
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referendum left the nation and the cabinet divided on a vital issue –how to share economic and 
political power in Kenya.  Then Roads Minister Raila Odinga and Environment Minister Kalonzo 
Musyoka, along several key ministers who led the group opposing the approval of the 
referendum, were sacked from Kibaki’s administration and subsequently formed a new 
opposition political party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).8 
The unresolved issue of the constitution was again important during the 2007 Elections. 
We find a high correlation between how people voted in the 2005 Referendum and people’s 
intention to vote in the 2007 Presidential elections. Of those respondents in our survey who 
participated in the 2005 constitutional referendum, 45 percent voted against the ratification of the 
draft constitution and 25 percent voted in favour of the draft constitution. Figure 6 shows that 
among those who voted in favour of the constitution, a large majority (83 percent) intended to 
vote for Kibaki. In contrast, 82 percent of those who voted against the draft constitution stated 
that they would vote for Odinga or Kalonzo.  Thus, the majority of those who supported the 
referendum, also supported Kibaki in the election. Similarly, the majority of those who voted 
against the draft constitution did not support Kibaki in the 2007 election.   
[Figure 6] 
V. Empirical Model of Voting Behaviour in Kenya:  
To understand the determinants of voting behavior in Kenya, we turn to testing a number of 
hypotheses of voter behavior within a rational choice framework.  The theoretical proposition of 
the rational voter model suggests that voters’ behavior is strategic, seeking to maximize their 
well-being and influenced by a number of factors that go beyond a voter’s socio-economic 
identity such as ethnicity.   
                                                 
8
 The ODM would face again Kibaki in the 2007 Presidential elections. In an unexpected twist, four months 
ahead of the elections the ODM split in two fractions as the party failed to select a presidential candidate. 
So Kibaki faced a divided opposition led by Odinga under ODM and Kalonzo Musyoka under the ODM 
faction –ODM-Kenya. 
 17
Here, we investigate what socio identities, economic interest, policy issues and 
grievances stirred Kenyans to vote (or not to vote) for Kibaki.   To do so, we focus our analysis 
on those survey respondents that claimed they were registered to vote and were planning to vote 
in the 2007 elections. This group consists of 1,095 people. That is about 91 percent of the 
survey’s original sample. We express Kenyan’s voting behaviour as in the following logistic 
equation: 
Odds Ratio (voting for Kibaki)i= ))(exp(1
1
βtx−+ =
β
0 +  
β
n xn + ui             eq(6) 
in which the dependent variable is whether the survey respondent indicated whether they would 
vote for Kibaki in the 2007 Presidential election or not. The 
β
n coefficients measure the effects of 
the factors xn (such as ethnicity and policy issues) on the probability of voting for Kibaki and ui  
represents the error term. 
We estimate equation (6) by adding sequentially a number of factors that might have 
influenced Kenyans’ voting intentions. The overall results are presented in Tables 1-3 in the 
appendix. The regression coefficients are presented as odds ratios. The odds ratio tells us by how 
much the odds of voting for Kibaki change for each unit change in the independent variable. An 
odds ratio of less than one indicates that the odds decrease as the independent variable increases. 
An odds ratio of equal to one indicates that the odds do not change as the independent variable 
increases. An odds ratio of greater than one indicates that the odds increase as the dependent 
variable increases.  
 
Ethnicity 
Kibaki speaking after his first Presidential election in 2002 welcomed his victory saying 
“Kenyans of every group, every race, every creed have embarked on a journey to a promising 
future.” A wave of democratic optimism swept Kenyans as Kibaki and the NARC, the multi-tribe 
alliance that backed his election, promised to out-root political tribalism.  Five years later, there 
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were serious doubts at home and internationally about the unity Kenyans felt in the 2007 
elections, and whether Kenyans voted merely along ethnic lines.  
In an attempt to assess the role of ethnicity in the 2007 elections we estimate a logistic 
regression the extent to which the intentions to vote for Kibaki were influenced by ethnicity, with 
and without controlling for any other factors.  
We define ethnic groups based on how survey respondents answered the question: “What 
is you tribe?”  All survey respondents answered this question, mentioning in total twenty three 
tribes. From these, we included our regression analysis only the major ethnic groups mentioned: 
Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Kamba, Kalenjin, Embu/Meru, Kisii, Mijikenda and Somali. These groups 
account for 90 percent of our survey’s original sample. These tribes also account for 90 percent of 
the population according to the latest Kenyan Census. 
In the logistic regression we introduce each ethnic group as a dummy variable. This 
facilitates interpreting the regression coefficients and also allows us to identify which ethnic 
alliances are more salient. The results of this model are shown in Table 1 under the column 
“Model 1”.   
The estimated coefficients suggest that the Kenyan electorate is divided. Voting intention 
of Luhyas, Kamba, Kissi and Mijikenda do not appear to be shaped by their ethnic group. 
However, voting intentions of the rest of main tribal groups, roughly 40 percent of survey 
respondents, were influenced by their ethnic origin. Specifically, the Luo and Kalenjin were less 
likely to vote for Kibaki. In contrast, the Kikuyu, Embu/Meru and Somalis, were most likely to 
vote for  Kibaki. In both cases, the salience of tribe of origin is statistically significant. For 
instance, people from Kikuyu origin were 24 times more likely to vote for Kibaki than those who 
were not Kikuyu.  
These findings suggest that a large percentage of Kenyan voters intended to vote along 
ethnic lines. However, before make any sound conclusions, we need to control for other factors 
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that could impact on voting intention. Otherwise, the logistic model just shown could be 
misspecified, resulting in having biased regression coefficients.  
Age 
In addition to one’s ethnic group, there are many other axis of identification.  Age, 
education level, religion, region, occupation, etc. could be used as basis of identity. Thus, we 
proceed to estimate the effect of other socio-economic factors in shaping Kenyan voting 
intentions. 
We begin by investigating the effect of a potential “generation divide” in voting 
behaviour. Kenyan’s population is overwhelming young. More than half of Kenyan’s total 
population is aged 18 or under and according to our survey 63 percent of Kenyan electorate are 
aged 18-34. Every generation sees the past through the lens of its own time. Young Kenyans 
might feel less nostalgia for the era of former president Daniel Moi than the older generations.  
Also, younger Kenyans have enjoyed the benefits from democracy and have been encouraged to 
be part of the generational change.9  
As shown in Model 2, we found statistically significant evidence to suggest that age 
influenced voting intentions. Specifically, we found that those aged 18-39 were less likely to vote 
for Kibaki, than those aged 40 or older.  This evidence suggests that Kenyan’s old and young 
generations might hold different political preferences.10   
Education 
We continue by testing the impact of education level on intentions to vote. Education could be an 
important part of one’s identity. Education might proxy for the opportunities that people have 
enjoyed and it can influence job opportunities hence living conditions that people might face.  
Further, people’s education level can give them different understanding and access to political 
                                                 
9
 The Institute for Education in Democracy claims that the number of registered young voters went up by one million 
thanks to the encouragement of young people to participate in the democratic process. The active participation of the 
young generations was also experienced in the 2007 MPs election where more people under the age of 35 contended 
for parliamentary and civic seats than ever before. 
10
 Later, we investigate more specifically on the role of generations in voting behaviour as shown in Table2. 
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information. In Kenya in particular, people’s education is likely to have influenced voting 
intentions. For instance, Odinga played on the grievances that educated but unemployed people 
might feel as he argued that the “…relatively well educated Kenyans are still excluded from the 
growth process.” (ODM 2007, p.9) 
As shown in Model 2, we find that Kenyans with secondary level of education and above 
are significantly less likely to vote for Kibaki than those with primary education or not at all.   
Religion 
It has been speculated in the media that religion -another important aspect of one’s identity-  
might have played an important role in the 2007 elections. The media pointed out that some 
religious leaders -from various faiths- encouraged their followers to cast their votes for specific 
candidates. Also, religion was used in political campaigning, as an instrument to divide Kenyans. 
However, we find no evidence to suggest that religion affected voting intentions. As shown in 
Table 3 (Models 1-3) we tested people’s religion as a dummy variable, using different groupings 
(such as Christians and Muslims) but these are not statistically significant.    
Other Socio-Economic Identities 
Occupation could be an important part of one’s identity. How we earn our living reflects our 
economic interests and socio-economic status. In some cases, occupations such as farmers or 
teachers, through their unions, establish strong political cleavages with political parties. In our 
regression (shown in Table 3) we find no evidence that people’s occupation played a statistically 
significant role in influencing voting intentions.   
We next turn to test for the effect of unemployment on voter intentions. Kenya suffers 
from unemployment crises. The unemployment rate reaches 40 per cent according to official 
figures (World Fact). This coincides with our survey’s results, where 43 percent of respondents 
stated that they were unemployed. Given the extent of unemployment, one could argue that 
likelihood of voting for Kibaki could be negatively affected by one’s labor market status. We find 
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that those who are unemployed are less likely to vote for Kibaki. However, this relationship is not 
statistically significant. 
As part of one’s identity, we finally test for whether voting intentions differed depending 
whether voters live in rural or urban areas. We find that people living in urban areas were less 
likely to vote for Kibaki, but this relationship is not statistically significant.  
Grievances 
We now focus here on assessing the importance of grievances that might have induced Kenyans 
to (not) vote for Kibaki. Kibaki’s administration has irrefutably delivered economic progress. 
However, such progress could be discounted if Kenyans hold grievances against his leadership. 
Specifically, we test for the effects of two sources of grievances on voting intentions:  
generalized- and individual-grievance.  
Firstly we test for generalized-grievance. We use this term to refer to the situation where 
voters consider Kibaki’s government as having not improved the treatment of all Kenyans -
regardless of their ethnic group- compared to previous governments. According to our survey, the 
majority of Kenyans (55 percent) state that Kibaki’s government had not made improvements in 
treating all groups in Kenya equally and fairly compared to previous regimes. When including 
this generalized-grievance in our logistic regression we find that it is significantly affects voter 
intentions. As shown in Model 3 (Table 1) Kenyans that felt that Kibaki’s government has not 
improved the treatment of all groups fairly were less likely to vote for him.  
Secondly, we test the importance of individual-grievance. This refers to the voters 
perceptions on how their specific living conditions have fared with Kibaki’s administration. To 
assess this we asked respondents how they rated their living conditions compared to other 
Kenyans. This question puts into perspective whether voter’s conditions -compared to others- 
have faired during Kibaki’s government in office. It also reflects about Kenyan’s beliefs and 
attitudes about economic inequality in the society. We find that Kenyans were less likely to vote 
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for Kibaki if they considered their economic conditions to be no better than the rest of Kenyans 
(Model 3, Table 1).  
In summary, we find that generalized- and individual-grievances reduce the likelihood of 
voting for Kibaki. It is also worth noting how the importance of ethnic origin change when 
measures of grievance are introduced in the logistic analysis. When measures of grievances, are 
included in the specification, the odds ratios of tribal origin for the Kikuyus, Embu/Meru weaken 
compared to the first and second model. The tribal origin for the Luos is weakened as well. In 
contrast, for the Kambas, when grievances are taken into account, their tribal identity becomes 
salient and statistically significant. 
Access to Public and Private Goods 
Even if voters notice that economic conditions delivered by the government have an effect on 
their lives, this need not influence their voting behaviour. At least, that is what previous research 
has found on voting behaviour in Kenya. To test this hypothesis we examine whether voting 
intentions were influenced by Kibaki’s track record with respect to provision of public goods and 
services. We also examine whether partisan predisposition against Kibaki’s party (PNU) 
impacted on how voters evaluated his performance and hence on their voting intentions. 
We start by examining the views on Kibaki’s performance in the recent past, specifically 
a year before the elections. In that year, Kenya achieved an economic growth of 6 percent, the 
highest rate of growth of Kibaki’s administration. In fact, that was the highest economic rate that 
Kenya has achieved in decades. Nonetheless, Kenya also experienced serious droughts in the year 
ahead of the elections. This produced severe shortages of water, and a fall in agriculture 
production in a country that is still mainly rural. Hence, differences in the fortunes of Kenyans 
might have increased.  
Our survey shows that a third of respondents disapproved Kibaki’s performance during 
the year before the election. We find that Kenyans are less likely to vote for Kibaki if they 
disapproved the overall performance of the government. To unravel the factors that influenced 
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voters to disapprove Kibaki’s performance, we test whether deprivation of basic necessities 
during the year before the election affected voting behaviour. We focus on whether respondents’ 
experienced shortages of each of six goods: food, water, medicines, cash to pay for school 
expenses, fuel to cook and water. We find no statistically significant evidence to suggest 
measures of deprivation influence voter intentions (Model 4).11 
We next assess the views on Kibaki’s performance in the more distant past.  For many 
Kenyans, Kibaki’s presidential victory in 2002 represented hope for a change from Moi’s rule. In 
our regression we added a dummy variable to account for whether survey respondents preferred 
Kibaki’s leadership to that of the immediate former President Daniel Moi. The question was 
phrased as:  “Looking back, how do you compare President Kibaki’s performance with President 
Moi’s performance with regard to the following matters?”  The list includes nine policies. We 
focus our analysis on the three main policies of Kibaki’s administration: “your living standards”,  
“the availability of jobs” and “the cost of sending your children to school.” 
As shown in Model 5, we find that Kenyans are more likely to vote for Kibaki if they 
prefer Kibaki’s performance to Moi’s in terms of living conditions and jobs. It might appear 
contradictory that we find Kenyans value Kibaki’s achievement in creating jobs, despite the still 
high unemployment rate in the country (43 percent according to our sample). As mentioned 
earlier, we found that those who were unemployed were less likely to vote for Kibaki, although 
this effect was not statistically significant. Perhaps voters that perceived an improvement in 
creating of jobs with respect to Moi’s rule are primarily those who were employed at the time of 
the survey. To test for this, we added an interaction term of views on Kibaki’s job creation record 
and the unemployment status of respondents. We found that this term is not statistically 
significant, meaning, that, regardless of whether people are unemployed or not, they still value 
                                                 
11
 We also construct an “economic shortage-index” which considers whether people experienced a shortage of any of 
these six goods. Again, we find a non- statistically significant effect of this economic shortage-index on voting 
intentions.  Thus, material deprivation does not appear to be an important factor influencing voter’s choices. 
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the improvements in jobs prospects brought by Kibaki’s administration. In other words, even if 
people are unemployed, the fact that there are more jobs available signals to them that the 
chances of being employed in the future are good.  
 Perhaps a more surprising result is that despite of Kibaki’s administration making good 
of the pledge to provide free primary education, we find no statistically significant effect on the 
(lowered) cost of sending children to school on voting intentions. According to our survey, only a 
third of respondents have children enrolled in primary school (28 percent in public school and 9 
percent in private school). Hence, the provision of free primary school might be valued only 
among those who currently benefit.  In fact, we find that provision of free primary school 
becomes statistically significant only when we interact the cost of education with having a child 
in primary school (public or private). In other words, voters do not value the provision of school 
as a public good, but they do so only when this is perceived as a “private good”, something that 
benefits them directly.  
One could argue that people from some ethnic-groups (such as Luo and Kalenjin) did not 
intend to vote for Kibaki because they discounted Kibaki’s track record. To assess this, in Table 3 
we split our sample in three sub-groups according to people’s ethnicity. Specifically, in Model 1 
we analyse all Kenyans except three tribes: the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru, whilst we analyse these 
three ethnic groups, specifically in Model 2. In Model 3 we study the voting intentions of Luo 
and Kalenjin only. We find that these three sub-groups have similar voting behaviour. However, 
provision of free primary education influenced voting for Kibaki, only among those of Kikuyu 
and Embu/Meru origin.   
Partisan predispositions 
So far we have assessed the impact of perceptions on Kibaki’s track record on voting behaviour. 
Voters’ perceptions on economic performance can be contradicted by actual changes in national 
economic conditions. These biases in perception may stem from people’s partisan ideology. 
People with weaker attachments to the incumbent political party might perceive the national 
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economy more negatively. According to our survey, 59 percent of survey respondents feel very 
distant to a political party, and 39 percent feel very distant in particular to Kibaki’s party, PNU. 
To test for this hypothesis we add interaction terms on views on economic policies by whether 
people feel distant to Kibaki’s party.  
We find that people who feel very distant to PNU, are less likely to vote for Kibaki and 
this relationship is statistically significant (with an odds ratio of .04) as shown in Table 1 (Model 
8). The three interaction terms, on living conditions, jobs and provision of free primary education 
are not statistically significant, hence not included in the regressions. This finding suggests that 
Kenyans broadly valued economic policies, regardless of how distant they felt to Kibaki’s 
political party.   
Overall, the evidence presented suggests that Kenyans voters behaviour are economically 
motivated, with retrospective interests, valuing access to public and private goods. This evidence 
contrast with that of previous studies that show Kenyans rather than voting economically, are just 
identity voters (Ndegwa 2003; Holmquist 2005; Logan, Wolf and Sentamu 2007).  
 
Corruption  
We also test for another main policy of Kibaki’s administration: War on corruption.  Kibaki’s 
administration focused on strengthening Kenya’s legal and institutional framework. For instance, 
his administration established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) as independent 
body, the Kenya National Audit Office, and an independent National Anti-Corruption Campaign 
Committee. But, despite these legal advances, Kibaki received criticism at home and abroad for 
not doing enough to fight corruption.  For instance, the ODM argued that: 
Of all the transgressions of the Kibaki presidency there is only one that towers above all 
else and that is his acceptance of corruption -past and present- advocating zero-tolerance 
at the swearing-in ceremony and now tolerating it one hundred percent...President Kibaki 
within months of his presidency completed his set of betrayals by letting the international 
down whom he had assured that he would eliminate corruption. (ODM 2007, p.15-16) 
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Perceptions on the extent of corruption might have lowered Kibaki’s credibility hence his 
chances for being re-elected. As shown previously, 24 percent of our survey respondents 
considered the honesty of candidates as the most important factor for selecting a presidential 
candidate. In a separate question, we ask Kenyans the extent to which they think Kibaki’s 
presidency was involved in corruption. The majority of respondents (58 percent) think that only a 
few officials in the presidential office were involved in corruption. Nonetheless, the rest of 
respondents (42 percent) think that all or most of the members of the presidential office were 
involved in corruption. 
In our logistic regression we include perceptions of corruption in the presidential office 
on voting intentions (Model 6). The results show that Kenyans that thought that there was much 
corruption in the presidency were less likely to vote for Kibaki as compared to those who thought 
that there was not much corruption. This effect is statistically significant and with an odds ratio of 
0.43.  
Referendum 
As we glimpsed in Section IV, the unresolved Constitutional debate seemed to have divided 
Kenyans in the 2005 referendum and also in the 2007 elections. This is confirmed in our results 
shown by Model 7. We find that Kenyans that voted in favour of the 2005 referendum reaffirmed 
their trust in Kibaki. Specifically we find that those who voted in favour of the referendum were 
7.1 times more likely to vote for Kibaki than those who voted against the referendum. Model 7 
also shows that those who did not vote in the referendum, were 2.1 times more likely to vote for 
Kibaki than those who voted against the referendum. The results suggest that the constitutional 
debate was the single most influential factor in shaping voting intentions, after the ethnicity of 
respondents.  
 
Group self-interest and voting behavior  
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So far we have analysed how on average various factors shaped voting intentions of Kenyans. 
Although this analysis allow us to make broad generalizations, it might ignore that voting 
behaviour might have differed in some groups. Voter heterogeneity, for instance with respect to 
how Kenyans identify themselves, can cause a systematic bias in voting behaviour, aggregate 
economic valuations and perceptions on grievances. To better take into account the impact of 
voter heterogeneity, we focus on analysing the voting behaviour of a number of sub-groups. We 
analyse separately the voting behaviour of the young and old generations, as well as how 
Kenyans identify themselves—either on the basis of their ethnicity, occupation or on nationalistic 
terms.  The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2.  
Generation Divide 
We start our analysis of sub-groups by analysing whether voting behaviour differed across 
generations. To do so, we re-run our analysis but splitting the sample into those aged 18-39 and 
those aged 40 and over. As shown in table 2 (Model 12 and 13), we find that the relationship 
between ethnicity and voting intentions -positive or negative- remains the same among the young 
and old generations. However, the strength and statistical significance of this relationship differs 
across generations. For example, ethnicity matters more in influencing the voting intentions of the 
old than young Kikuyus. Specifically, for the young generations, people of Kikuyu origin are 6 
times more likely to vote for Kibaki than those young non Kikuyus. For the older generations, 
Kikuyus are 169 times more likely to vote for Kibaki than those older non Kikuyus. The same 
pattern is found for the Embu/Meru. However, the effect of being of Embu/Meru is not 
statistically significant among the old generations. For Luos and Kambas, their tribe of origin is 
statistically significant in influencing voting intentions, but only among the young. This result of 
young Luos and Kambas practicing identity politics is rather surprising and may reflect 
identification with the respective presidential candidates. 
We can infer that tribe influenced voting behaviour differently across generations. Our 
results also show that old and young generations hold different voting attitudes. In contrast to 
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older generations, young people’s voting intention are not influenced by their education, 
disapproval of Kibaki’s performance, provision of free primary education or by views on 
corruption. The only resemblance in voting behaviour between the young and old generations is 
their views on the referendum and preference of living conditions under Kibaki’s versus Mois’ 
rule.  
Ethnic Group as Main Identity 
We now turn attention to investigating voting behavior based on how Kenyans identify 
themselves. For this analysis, we split the survey sample according to the self-expressed main 
identity of respondents.  In Model 14, we first examine the voting behavior of those who identify 
themselves first and foremost on the basis of their ethnic origin. According to our survey, twenty 
percent of survey respondents identify in this way.  We first focus on studying the strength of 
people’s ethnicity on voting intentions. We find that Kikuyus are approximately 17 times more 
likely to vote for Kibaki than non-Kikuyus.12 The strength of this relationship is stronger than the 
one reported in Table 1 in Model 7 (which controls for the same factors as in Model 14) but that 
includes all survey respondents likely to vote.  In Model 14 we also observe that people from 
Kamba origin are less likely to vote for Kibaki, as we had seen in Models 3 to 7 in Table 1. For 
this group of people who identify on ethnic basis, the provision of jobs is the only other factor 
that is important in influencing their voting behavior, other than ethnic group.  Hence, the voting 
behavior of this group of people is different than the “average Kenyan” (as analyzed in Table 1). 
Their ethnic identity is so strong that all other issues do not seem to influence their voting 
behavior.  
 
Occupation as Main Identity 
                                                 
12
 In Model 14 it not possible to quantify the extent to which the origin of Embu/Meru and Luo influence their voting 
intention. This is because there is no variability in the dependent variable (whether to vote or not for Kibaki) within 
these two groups. In other words, the tribe origin for these two groups predicts perfectly the intention to vote (or not to 
vote in case of the Luos) for Kibaki.  
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The reason why people might identify on occupation basis could be because they have found 
channels, other than their own ethnic group, to exercise and express their political and economic 
interests. In Model 15 we examine the voting behavior of those who identify themselves first and 
foremost in terms of their occupation, which represent 18 percent of the sample. As anticipated, 
for this group of voters, ethnicity does not influence their voting intentions.  This group was in 
fact the only one whose ethnicity did not affect voting intentions among the various sub-groups of 
populations analyzed. For this group, the most important factors that influence their voting 
intentions are their economic and political interests. Moreover, this group places more weight on 
their living conditions, corruption and how they voted in the referendum than any other group.  
Nationalism: An Illusion of Unity?  
The crucial importance of building a national identity, Amartya Sen argues, lies in its constructive 
political and civil role. A national identity can combat the divisions created by having groups 
identified with one key trait -such as ethnicity- and embracing a broader, richer and more 
complex understanding of ourselves (Sen 2006).  In Model 16 we turn our attention to examining 
the voting behavior of those identified first and foremost in nationalistic terms –that is, referred 
themselves as Kenyans. The hypothesis to test is whether the ethnic origin among this group did 
not intermediate in their voting intentions. Surprisingly our results reveal a different picture. For 
Kikuyus and Embu/Merus, ethnicity is the most important factor shaping voting intentions than 
for any other group.   For example, the odds ratio coefficient show that among those who 
identified themselves as Kenyans, Kikuyus are 119 times more likely to vote for Kibaki than 
people from other groups. Those of Embu/Meru origin are 14 times more likely to vote for 
Kibaki. These odds ratios for these two tribes are the largest than any our previous models. This 
result begs one question. What exactly people understand by identifying themselves as Kenyans? 
Could it be case that people identified as Kenyan referring to their own tribe -excluding other 
tribes- as their nation? Or could it mean that those from a Kikuyu and Embu/Meru origin strongly 
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feel that Kibaki was more capable than the opposition in delivering a comprehensive and 
inclusive development to all Kenyans, regardless of which tribe one comes from?   
Overall, the analysis presented here reveals that population sub-groups exhibit very 
different voting behavior.  We observe asymmetries in reactions to economic indicators across 
voters. These reactions appear to be motivated by how Kenyans identify themselves first and 
foremost and not so much by their socio-economic characteristics. As Table 4 shows, Kenyans’ 
that identify on tribal, nationalistic or occupation basis have in general similar characteristics.  
 
VII. Conclusions 
This paper has provided a detailed analysis of key factors that influenced voter preferences during 
the 2007 Kenyan elections. We provide evidence of the rational voter hypothesis using a rich 
dataset of voter characteristics and revealed preferences.  We find that, while ethnicity is 
important, it is but one of other factors such as policy performance of the incumbent, economic 
conditions, etc. that influence voter preferences. Furthermore, we find that how Kenyans identify 
themselves is itself an important determinant of voting choices. We generally find that the society 
is politically polarized which may be reflective perceptions of isolation either politically/and or 
economically.  While we have not made a direct connection between polarization and post-
election violence, we can infer that such polarization can indeed trigger violence. 
 An indication from the survey is that the constitutional reform debate remains central to 
the issues dividing Kenyans.  We suggest that the many issues that seem to divide Kenyans may 
be dealt with through a constitutional reform process.  In particular, there seems to be widespread 
perceptions of unfairness. Such perceptions of discrimination, real or imaginary, can cause 
grievances that translate into conflicts.  The results provided in this paper offer insights into some 
of the issues that divide Kenyans and which could be harmonized in a constitution.  
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Figure 1. Self-Described Voting Motivations 
 
Figure 2. Voting Intentions by People’s Tribe of Origin 
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Figure 3. Voting Intentions by Kenyan’s Main Identify 
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Figure 4. Voting Intentions  by Kibaki’s Approval Rating  
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Figure 5. Voting Intentions by how People’s Perceive their Living Conditions 
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Figure 6. Voting Intentions by How People Voted in 2005 Referendum 
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Table 1. Probability of Voting for Kibaki 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Ethnic Origins Kikuyu 23.510*** 24.945*** 20.622*** 21.394*** 16.319*** 16.127*** 7.757*** 8.189***
(7.528) (8.261) (7.119) (8.504) (6.565) (6.891) (3.378) (3.988)
Embu/Meru 19.500*** 20.030*** 15.714*** 13.059*** 11.521*** 10.358*** 4.975** 6.204**
(7.401) (7.831) (6.426) (5.976) (5.478) (5.192) (2.678) (3.619)
Somali 3.257** 3.092** 3.572** 4.056* 3.355* 3.203 2.782 1.893
(1.339) (1.317) (1.735) (2.461) (2.048) (2.090) (1.864) (1.113)
Luo 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.132*** 0.174** 0.191** 0.253* 0.228* 0.311
(0.050) (0.051) (0.067) (0.102) (0.106) (0.146) (0.139) (0.220)
Kalenjin 0.444* 0.436* 0.390* 0.530 0.430 0.469 0.466 0.535
(0.162) (0.164) (0.159) (0.242) (0.208) (0.239) (0.263) (0.328)
Kamba 0.582 0.577 0.435* 0.509 0.325** 0.355* 0.210** 0.197**
(0.197) (0.198) (0.158) (0.214) (0.135) (0.163) (0.102) (0.101)
Luhya 0.791 0.811 0.926 1.329 0.796 0.889 0.723 1.007
(0.232) (0.248) (0.294) (0.498) (0.307) (0.375) (0.308) (0.509)
Kissi 0.908 1.008 1.094 1.456 1.299 1.370 1.168 1.939
(0.296) (0.339) (0.390) (0.585) (0.556) (0.640) (0.575) (0.997)
Mijikenda 0.874 0.854 0.819 1.085 0.781 0.859 0.677 0.619
(0.313) (0.318) (0.317) (0.462) (0.367) (0.477) (0.359) (0.359)
Age (18-39) 0.639* 0.551** 0.581* 0.562* 0.540* 0.557* 0.673
(0.120) (0.109) (0.129) (0.128) (0.133) (0.157) (0.210)
Education (Secundary and higher) 0.717 0.640* 0.685 0.496** 0.562* 0.569* 0.580
(0.131) (0.127) (0.146) (0.119) (0.149) (0.160) (0.173)
Government has treated all 
groups same/worse 0.314*** 0.414*** 0.382*** 0.471** 0.469** 0.524*
(0.057) (0.086) (0.081) (0.108) (0.115) (0.143)
Respondent's living conditions 
worse/same than other Kenyans 0.370*** 0.423*** 0.524** 0.549* 0.611 0.448*
(0.070) (0.093) (0.120) (0.135) (0.166) (0.173)
Dissapprove Kibaki's 
performance in last 12 months 0.215*** 0.371** 0.381* 0.673
(0.060) (0.127) (0.150) (0.185)
Last year did not have enough: Food 0.632*
(0.147)
0.995
(0.242)
Prefer Kibaki’s to Moi's 
performance: Living conditions 2.517*** 2.395*** 2.271** 2.403**
(0.572) (0.588) (0.624) (0.691)
Jobs 1.820* 1.641* 1.464 1.191
(0.425) (0.409) (0.397) (0.336)
Cost of educationa 1.727* 1.735* 1.717 2.042*
(0.407) (0.448) (0.490) (0.621)
0.438*** 0.432** 0.449**
(0.107) (0.115) (0.127)
Referendum          Voted in favour 7.133*** 5.479***
 (Voted against) (2.412) (1.862)
Didn't vote 2.251** 2.253**
(0.643) (0.684)
Feel very distant to PNU 0.040***
(0.023)
Constant 0.389*** 0.664 2.863** 2.883** 1.236 0.719 0.441 0.478
(0.087) (0.178) (0.979) (1.126) (0.555) (0.384) (0.248) (0.311)
Likelihood Ratio 545.91 534.65 593.79 565.50 486.10 508.56 552.10 595.48
R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.42 0.46 0.44 0.48 0.53 0.59
N (Likely to vote) 1095 1072 1036 886 778 745 733 733
Coefficients as Odds Ratio. Significance Level, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
a Given that respondents have children in primary school (public or private)
There is Much Corruption in Presidency
   Money for paying children's school expensesa
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Table 2. Probability of Voting for Kibaki by Identity 
All except: 
Kikuyu, 
Embu/Meru
Only 
Kikuyu, 
Embu/Meru
Only Luo 
and 
Kalenjin
Only those 
aged 18-39
Only those 
aged 40 + Tribe
Occupation/
Class Kenyan
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Ethnic Origins Kikuyu 6.226*** 169.258* 16.995** 1.706 163.952***
(2.836) (380.595) (18.438) (1.684) (180.093)
Embu/Meru 4.399** 31.158 0.128* 0.506 11.200*
(2.442) (58.115) (0.130) (0.592) (10.513)
Somali 3.335 2.696 1.163 3.214 0.855
(2.224) (1.977) (1.706) (4.151) (1.336)
Luo 0.211* 0.101* 0.414 0.275 0.034**
(0.137) (0.112) (0.708) (0.259) (0.039)
Kalenjin 0.481 0.521 0.144 0.665 0.772 0.171*
(0.272) (0.372) (0.212) (0.744) (0.875) (0.146)
Kamba 0.142*** 0.163** 0.055 0.113* 0.227 0.072**
(0.075) (0.097) (0.087) (0.119) (0.252) (0.067)
Luhya 0.637 0.664 0.773 0.680 0.472 1.179
(0.276) (0.320) (1.044) (0.667) (0.515) (0.855)
Kissi 1.083 0.981 2.805 0.772 0.273 1.117
(0.548) (0.512) (4.468) (0.736) (0.404) (0.956)
Mijikenda 0.658 0.901 0.221 0.175 1.797 1.194
(0.356) (0.568) (0.334) (0.190) (2.548) (0.823)
Age (18-39) 0.622 0.801 0.680 0.870 0.921 0.253*
(0.212) (0.252) (0.193) (0.585) (0.558) (0.15)
Education (Secundary and higher) 0.617 0.514* 0.745 0.750 0.046** 0.278 0.371 0.385
(0.194) (0.147) (0.192) (0.242) (0.048) (0.223) (0.237) (0.216)
0.380*** 0.508* 0.461*** 0.501* 0.321 0.502 1.265 0.217**
(0.109) (0.140) (0.105) (0.139) (0.238) (0.276) (0.703) (0.111)
0.448 0.408* 0.261*** 0.249** 1.324 0.393 0.290 0.094*
(0.197) (0.153) (0.092) (0.126) (1.134) (0.325) (0.195) (0.103)
0.743 0.815 0.632 0.854 0.037** 0.414 0.552 0.689
(0.251) (0.232) (0.149) (0.257) (0.039) (0.269) (0.275) (0.418)
Prefer Kibaki’s to 
Moi's performance: Living conditions 1.899* 2.537** 3.114*** 1.954* 7.742* 3.995 3.754* 2.336
(0.606) (0.734) (0.776) (0.645) (6.392) (3.330) (2.080) (1.506)
Jobs 2.163* 1.320 0.985 1.461 1.834 4.014* 1.020 1.669
(0.677) (0.367) (0.232) (0.445) (1.400) (2.540) (0.663) (0.908)
Cost of educationa 1.791 2.087* 1.491 1.879 5.123* 2.521 2.568 0.771
(0.599) (0.635) (0.406) (0.623) (4.220) (2.091) (1.491) (0.526)
0.542* 0.293** 0.024*** 0.581 0.048** 1.391 0.115*** 0.672
(0.168) (0.158) (0.040) (0.178) (0.041) (0.911) (0.070) (0.362)
Referendum          Voted in favour 11.934*** 8.826*** 11.449*** 4.947*** 30.696** 3.791 26.154*** 47.495***
 (Voted against) (5.343) (3.348) (3.311) (1.909) (33.067) (3.411) (21.863) (37.163)
Didn't vote 2.365* 2.670** 2.411*** 1.899* 21.015** 0.521 11.105*** 2.735
(0.791) (0.827) (0.629) (0.579) (21.750) (0.452) (6.393) (1.498)
Constant 0.398 0.148*** 0.417 0.288* 0.245 1.462 0.067 1.329
(0.262) (0.083) (0.196) (0.171) (0.428) (1.771) (0.101) (1.331)
Likelihood Ratio 200.78 159.02 314.38 364.42 207.32 55.26 152.94 152.94
R-squared 0.37 0.30 0.38 0.50 0.74 0.41 0.55 0.55
N (Likely to vote) 476 476 608 530 203 99 201 286
Coefficients as Odds Ratio. Significance Level, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
a Given that respondents have children in primary school (public or private)
Only those that First and Foremost Identity as:Generation Divide
There is Much Corruption in Presidency
Sample split according to people's tribe 
Respondent's living conditions 
worse/same than other Kenyans
Dissapprove Kibaki's performance in last 
12 months
Government has treated all groups 
same/worse 
 
 40
Table 3. Probability of Voting for Kibaki by Socio-Economic-identities 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Ethnic Origins Kikuyu 22.527*** 23.151*** 22.562*** 24.406*** 23.989*** 23.075*** 25.316***
(7.453) (7.655) (7.564) (7.748) (7.808) (7.469) (8.452)
Embu/Meru 18.592*** 19.167*** 18.130*** 19.949*** 19.947*** 18.764*** 28.106***
(7.181) (7.407) (7.012) (7.671) (7.638) (7.143) (12.269)
Somali 3.735** 3.765** 3.569* 3.187** 3.661** 2.995* 2.575*
(1.900) (1.915) (1.859) (1.327) (1.541) (1.339) (1.181)
Luo 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.080*** 0.084***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.054) (0.053) (0.044) (0.047)
Kalenjin 0.429* 0.428* 0.391* 0.399* 0.465* 0.405* 0.469*
(0.158) (0.158) (0.148) (0.153) (0.170) (0.151) (0.174)
Kamba 0.573 0.569 0.561 0.579 0.569 0.569 0.634
(0.200) (0.198) (0.196) (0.200) (0.196) (0.193) (0.224)
Luhya 0.765 0.776 0.736 0.866 0.823 0.775 0.714
(0.228) (0.231) (0.222) (0.258) (0.244) (0.230) (0.223)
Kissi 0.809 0.821 0.789 0.934 0.952 0.933 0.890
(0.299) (0.301) (0.289) (0.307) (0.313) (0.307) (0.305)
Mijikenda 0.916 0.926 0.869 0.857 0.868 0.884 0.978
(0.334) (0.334) (0.317) (0.314) (0.318) (0.317) (0.360)
Religion Protetant 0.845
(Catholic base group) (0.177)
Christian 1.185
(0.336)
Mulim 0.806
(0.335)
Other 1.115
Religion (0.330)
(Christians broadly defined base group) Muslim 0.850 0.857
(0.338) (0.345)
Others 1.173 1.126
(0.330) (0.322)
Received a lot info from religious leaders 0.957
(0.196)
Occupation Worker 1.051
(Agrarian base group) (0.242)
Professional 0.902
(0.195)
Student 1.448
(0.664)
Housewife 0.597
(0.283)
Never had a job 0.925
(0.287)
Unemployed 0.919
(0.158)
Trust somewhat/a lot Kenyans from 
other ethnic groups 1.191
(0.205)
Feel very distant to a political party 0.860
(0.161)
Constant 0.417** 0.392*** 0.420*** 0.393*** 0.391*** 0.310*** 0.430**
(0.112) (0.093) (0.102) (0.100) (0.095) (0.105) (0.113)
Likelihood Ratio 535.94 534.33 528.04 534.29 534.82 527.79 524.28
R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.39
N (Likely to vote) 1095 1095 1073 1080 1086 1067 1003
Coefficients as Odds Ratio. Significance Level, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Table 4. Characteristic of Kenyans by Identity Group 
Average Tribe
Occupation/
Class Kenyans
Tribe
Kikuyu 19.5 28.7 28.7 19.2
Luhya 14.0 12.5 12.7 14.9
Luo 12.3 11.8 12.0 12.1
Kamba 9.4 6.5 6.2 9.4
Kalenjin 8.7 11.1 11.3 8.7
Kissi 8.4 8.2 8.4 8.3
Embumeru 9.4 5.4 5.5 9.2
Mijikenda 6.1 3.6 3.3 6.2
Somali 3.1 3.6 3.3 3.1
Age
18-39 73.9 71.5 74.4 76.3
40 + 26.1 28.5 25.6 23.7
Education
Primary or Less 28.7 32.4 26.9 23.2
Secondary/High school 46.2 42.1 43.7 51.7
Post-secondary qualifications 25.1 25.5 29.4 25.1
Occupation
Agrarian 25.7 29.0 17.6 27.3
Worker 23.5 22.4 24.5 23.7
Professional 34.5 33.2 41.7 33.1
Student 3.0 2.3 3.2 2.9
Housewife 5.9 4.7 7.2 6.5
Never had a job 7.3 8.4 5.8 6.5
Partisan predispositions
Feel distant to PNU 27.8 29.1 25.1 28.5
Setting
Rural 60.0 61.1 52.3 61.4
Urban 40.0 38.9 47.7 38.6
Living conditions rated to 
other Kenyans
Much better/Better 36.5 31.0 40.1 36.3
Worse/Same 63.5 66.2 59.1 62.3
N (likely to vote) 1095 216 279 422
 
 
 
